My dissertation looks at the domestic consequences of international organizations. In particular, I examine the design, outcomes, and domestic responses to International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. I explore how variation in human rights, factor abundance, and collective dissent shape the design of IMF programs in ways that help maximize compliance. Once a program is designed I show how compliance with conditionality impacts labor rights as a result of austerity policies as well as the signal that IMF programs convey to market actors. The negative human rights consequences of these programs sparks collective dissent in some countries but not others. I explore how compliance with conditionality and factor abundance help to explain variation in IMF induced political violence. I explore these questions with a new dataset I have collected on compliance with IMF conditions from 2002-2015. This dataset measures compliance at both the policy and loan level and also provides a host of loan specific measures such as loan size, whether the loan was precautionary, whether it ended early, the type of loan, the type of policy, and multiple measures of policy compliance.