My dissertation explores the domestic consequences of International Financial Institution agreements. In particular, I examine the consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. I argue that high compliance with conditionality is unpopular and undermines human rights as a result of austerity policies, however low compliance may improve domestic outcomes as leaders use IMF funds to buy support and/or avoid implementing unpopular and harmful reforms. I show that low compliance is associated with better labor rights outcomes, less protest, and less repression. High compliance on the other hand is associated with a decline in labor rights, an uptick in violent protest, and greater state repression of physical integrity rights. Domestic protest and repression is also influenced by behaviors in neighboring countries also under IMF programs. I explore these questions with a new dataset on compliance with IMF conditionality in IMF loans between 2002 and 2015. This dataset provides a host of loan specific measures such as loan size, whether the loan was precautionary, whether it ended early, the type of loan, the type of policy, and multiple measures of conditionality compliance at both the loan and policy level.